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ABSTRACT
NCAA Division I Football Bowl Subdivision:
The Importance of Recruiting and Its
Relationship with
Team Performance
by
Nathan S. Lloyd, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2011
Major Professor: Dr. Chris Fawson
Department: Economics and Finance

Talent wins college football games. Wins bring in money. Colleges, fans and media
hype up the recruiting season as the key to success in the college football season. Is it though?
Athletic programs spend large sums of capital and resources to recruit the most talented players
possible. This paper explores the relationship between recruited talent and team performance
using a simultaneous equations model. Higher players’ talent leads to better team performance
and a recruiting class has its biggest impact immediately following signing. A team’s
performance, especially of the most recent season, impacts its ability to recruit. Talent and
success experience bidirectional causation, meaning they concurrently cause each other. The
theory that top teams maintain top status is true. The theory holds true for all teams as well.
Bidirectional causation proved here explains lack of performance mobility across all levels of the
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).
(38 pages)
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the amateur status of NCAA athletes, the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS) (formerly Division IA) is a booming commercial industry. In 2009, the top football
programs earned over $50 million in profits (Schwartz, 2009)! Eighty-three of 118 reporting
football programs were profitable, with thirty-five of them profiting over $10 million (U.S.
Department of Education). Attracting elite high school and junior college players to a program is
assumed to translate into future wins, prestige and money for a program. Robert Brown of Cal
State University San Marcos estimates that a “premium” player - one later drafted into the NFLadds $1.1 million of revenue to his university (Brown, 2011).
Every year, college football programs spend huge amounts of time, money and effort in
the competitive game off the field known as “recruiting”. In 2001, the average Division IA
program spent $526,000 on recruiting (Weiberg, 2003). This amount jumped to over $750,000
by the 2009 - 2010 academic year, and 29 schools in the FBS spent over $1 million in recruiting
alone (U.S. Department of Education). This does not even account for expenses related to
recruiting such as scouting and phone bills which are reported to the Department of Education
in a separate expense category. It is also important to note that the NCAA limits recruiting
activities. The NCAA breaks down the calendar into different periods where varying levels of
recruiting can occur. Schools and coaches are limited by quotas in their official visits to
prospective student-athletes1. Student hosts can be paid a maximum of $30/day to cover
entertainment for the host and prospect (NCAA bylaw 13.6.7.5). Advertising for recruits is
forbidden (NCAA bylaw 13.4.3.1). These “collusive restrictions on payments” for recruiting

1

For example, a football program is allowed 56 total official visits annually and the head coach is allowed
just one day/year to visit each given prospective student-athlete (see NCAA bylaws 13.6.2.6 and
13.1.2.6.2 for respective examples) (NCAA)
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expenses and other factors of football production such as player compensation, are evidence to
the NCAA’s cartel behavior (Kahn, 2007). If not for these cartel-like behaviors of the NCAA
which restrict recruiting, the expense would surely be much greater.
A Sports Illustrated article entitled “A History of Recruiting” shows how important
football programs perceive recruiting by revealing the great lengths that these programs will go
to in order to innovate and work with NCAA bylaws. One school recently produced comic books
with their recruit prospects as the main character, leading the team to a national championship.
These, along with personalized jerseys, text messaging and other creative recruiting tools have
since been banned by the NCAA (Staples, 2008). As of summer 2011, video chats, Facebook
accounts and email, among other methods of recruiting, remain legal under NCAA bylaws.
With all the cost and effort surrounding recruiting, one must ask, “Is it worth it? Do
better recruits translate into more wins?” Clearly a football team’s profit is a function of success
on the field but is success a function of its players’ talent? When do recruits begin to impact
their team and by how much? Does winning increase a team’s ability to attract elite recruits?
Answering these critical questions aids athletic administrators and coaches in their jobs.
Implications of this study may justify teams in their large expenditures related to recruiting.
Results of this study should help teams in their planning and recruiting efforts of players.
Knowing they operate in a cycle where recruiting leads to team performance which in turn leads
to recruiting, and so forth, would provide insight into needed policy moves. Athletic
administrators could focus on breaking the cycle by hiring coaches more focused on recruiting,
or more proven as great recruiters, expend more time and money on recruiting and less on
stadium/facility enhancement, etc.
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LITERARY REVIEW
Sports economics literature involving football falls into various main camps: those
modeling production of wins as a function of performance statistics, those modeling attendance
as a function of various determinants, literature about coaches, literature involving team
performance and its effect on university variables, and those who study the recruiting aspect of
the game. An example of the first camp is the work by Keith Willoughby of Bucknell University.
He studies winning in the Canadian Football League. The dichotomous dependent variable
representing win-loss is regressed on in-game statistics such as the difference in passing yards,
rushing yards, turnovers, etc. between the observed team and its opponent. Teams should
control the line of scrimmage and focus on dominating these in-game statistics to win the game
(Willoughby, 2002). Related studies may differ in their selected explanatory performance
statistics used, but most are attempting to model wins in this fashion in order to prescribe
coaching policies and emphases for the game. Some studies, such as Stephen Clarke’s, look at
the effect of home field advantage in athletic competition (Clarke, 2005).
Timothy DeSchriver and Paul Jensen present an economic demand model for spectator
attendance in NCAA Division II competitions. Winning percentage and promotional activities
such as homecoming positively affect attendance. Winning’s effect on attendance grows as the
season gets closer to the end (DeSchriver and Jensen, 2002). Attendance has been studied in
NCAA Division I as well. A predictive model sets attendance as a function of game-specific,
university-specific and team-specific determinants. The recent on-field success of the home
team, visiting team, tradition of the home team and being rivals are the biggest positive
predictors of attendance demand (Price and Sen, 2003). Conference realignment has an effect
on attendance too. Recently, many teams have changed conference affiliation for more
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competitive conferences. After controlling for the higher quality opponents, their attendance
increases (Groza, 2010).
Coaching is another area of football literature. Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino develop a
model to show that under the NCAA’s “cartel agreement” to not provide player compensation,
coaches’ salaries rise (Farmer and Pecorino, 2010). Recently, Paul Holmes presents a model that
uses logistic regression methods to estimate dismissal probability for FBS head coaches.
Stronger recent team performance decreases the chance of dismissal but stronger historical
performances of a team increase the chance of the current coach’s dismissal (Holmes, 2011).
One niche in literature specific to college football involves the relationship between
team performance and various university variables such as alumni donations, academic quality
and state appropriations. “Alumni giving” literature is divided and estimates of the effect a
team’s success has on donations vary depending on what variables are used in the model, how
“success” is defined, and whether the sample includes private or public universities (Kahn,
2007). A football program’s culture and tradition, more than on-field success, positively
contribute to academic quality (Smith, 2009). Although on-field success does not explain stategovernment appropriations for universities, simply fielding a football team does (Humphreys,
2006). These are examples of the literature regarding football’s effects on campus activity.
Another camp of literature involving college football focuses on the aspect of recruiting.
Klenosky, Templin and Troutman of Purdue University present an economic model of the college
football recruiting process (Klenosky, et. al, 2001). They find that factors such as the coaching
staff, playing time potential and playing on television have some significance in determining the
recruit’s school of choice. Dumond, Lynch and Platania model recruits as rational agents seeking
to maximize their discounted expected utility. They create a predictive model to determine the
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likelihood a recruit will sign with a given school. Factors influencing a recruit’s decisions,
conditional on being offered the scholarship, include the distance between the school’s city and
his hometown, whether or not the team is a “BCS” team, the team’s recent performance,
academic reputation and media exposure (Dumond, et. al, 2008).
This project aligns with a different aspect of recruiting literature however- exploring the
relationship between recruiting and team performance. George Langelett finds that teams with
success on the field are able to attract quality recruits, which in turn increases the quality of
future team performance. Only the top 10 recruiting classes are observed along with the top 25
teams for each year in his study; the data set he uses is not representative of Division I FBS
(Langelett, 2003). His feedback system between team performance and recruiting supports the
phenomenon where top teams remain top teams. My study seeks to test the generalized
conclusions of Langelett. I test if the immobile nature (in terms of performance) of the vast
majority of teams across all FBS levels can be explained by the theory of bidirectional causation
of recruiting and team performance.
To show the lack of mobility of teams across performance levels, consider the following
facts: the net average change for a team’s rating from year to year is .021; for the median team
of 2010, taking the average change would translate into the exact same ranking in 2011 (given
the same team ratings of 2010 for the other teams). The largest rating gain from year-to-year
was 28.73 in my data set- even the bottom 48.7% of 2010 teams could not be ranked number 1
next year with that kind of enormous improvement. Also, in 13 years only 43 unique FBS teams
have ever finished in the top 102. Lack of performance mobility may be explained by
bidirectional causation of team performance and recruiting.

2

Author’s data calculations
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The buzz and hoopla surrounding National Signing Day3 and the entire recruitment
season is based on the assumption that a talented recruiting class will convert into a highranked football team over the next four years. George Langelett showed this assumption to be
true in his 2003 article, published in the Journal of Sports Economics. I hypothesize this theory
should be extended to the entire FBS. If top talent leads to high team performance, the
opposite should be true - low talent should produce lower ranked teams. Theory suggests
recruits affect team performance most their freshman year (year signed=red-shirt year, next
year = freshman year), but the impact of a recruit is discounted over the remainder of his time
with the program (Langelett, 2003).
Another common perception is that teams with recent success will attract better
recruits. Specifically, theory states that a team’s performance best explains recruiting at its twoyear lag (Langelett, 2003). This bidirectional theoretical framework of team performance and
recruiting will be modeled empirically.

3

First Wednesday in February
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ECONOMETRIC MODELING
I propose a simultaneous equations model to test the theoretical hypotheses, because
of the bidirectional nature of team performance and recruiting. I take advantage of recruiting
class data and team rankings now available for all teams in the FBS. Following literature, the
first equation (Equation I) includes Team Performance (TP) which is regressed solely on
Recruiting Class talent (RC) and its lags. Since players are given five years of eligibility when
using a red-shirt year, they may affect a team’s performance over five years. The fifth-year lag
of recruiting classes is included in the model to control for this possibility. Equation I appears as:
Team Performance = f (Red-shirt, Freshman, Sophomore, Junior, Senior),
or, alternatively in lag form:
Team Performance = f (RC,

,

,

,

).

Team Performance is the dependent variable of Equation I. Using Jeff Sagarin’s
computer ratings of all FBS teams, teams’ performance is measured by their end-of-season
rating. Like Groza, I use Sagarin ratings to represent recent on-field success (Groza, 2010).
Sagarin ratings are used to measure team performance because of their validity in the sports
world, being the supplier to the USA Today’s rankings. Also, the Bowl Championship Series
(BCS) uses Sagarin ratings to formulate their rankings and make decisions on their prestigious
bowl game participants. Other popular polls such as the AP Top 25 or BCS rankings are not used
since these only rank the top teams, and not every team in the FBS. Team ratings are used, as
opposed to rankings, for accuracy of measurement since the difference between pairs of
rankings is not equidistant, and to avoid censored data.
Recruited talent of a team is represented by the recruiting ranking each entering class
receives upon joining a team. Every year, scout.com rates all players who sign with NCAA FBS
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teams on a scale of 1-5 “stars”. Recruits of the highest talent are given 5 stars, followed by
those with 4 stars, etc. down to 1 for the least-talented recruits. Scout.com awards points to
every team, taking into account both their recruits’ absolute talent and their relative talent to
other teams4. Rankings are assigned each FBS team as determined by their overall point total5.
Scout.com was acquired by Fox Interactive Company in 2005 to be a supplier of information to
Fox Sports. Scout.com and its affiliate in production, Superprep.com, are leaders of the
recruiting information industry.
Equation l is represented algebraically as follows:

where Y is the final team rating, i indexes the team of analysis, t is the index for time, α is the
intercept term, ε is the error term to account for the random nature of models, and β is the
coefficient for explanatory variable X, the team’s recruiting class ranking (RC). RC and its four
lags are included in the model to cover the time athletes play for a team.

is the beta

coefficient for the recruiting class of the current year, or the red-shirt freshmen.

is the beta

coefficient for the recruiting class of last year, or the current freshman players, and so forth.
Because recruiting is also affected by prior performance of a team, the empirical model
is only accurate with the inclusion of Equation II. This tests the theory that a high school player
uses current teams’ performance to choose where to attend school. Dumond, Lynch and
Platania showed that a team’s current performance is a major factor in a recruit’s decision of
where to play in college (Dumond, et. al, 2008). Equation II is given as:
4

The formula is based on a player’s rating and ranking: 5-star=200 points, 4-star=120 points, 3-star=40
points, 2-star=20 points, 1-star=0 points. The number 1-ranked player (assuming 100 players in his
position) of a position=100 points, number 2=99 points, down to number 100=1 point. A maximum of 25
recruits/team are evaluated towards a team’s points and ranking.
5
These rankings are updated regularly and slightly change from time to time. My data was last updated
July 2011.
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Recruiting Class = g (Senior HS, Junior HS, Sophomore HS, Freshman HS),
which allows for the player’s four years of high school attendance and his decision period. This
is shown alternatively with team performance lags:
Recruiting Class = g (

,

,

,

)

Algebraically, this becomes:

where Y is the recruiting class ranking, i indexes the team of analysis, t is the index for time, α is
the intercept term, ε is the error term to account for the random nature of models, and β is the
coefficient for explanatory variable X, the team’s performance (TP). Four lags are included in
the model to cover the time recruits attend high school and scout their potential future teams.
is the beta coefficient for the team performance last year, or while the recruits are seniors in
high school.

is the beta coefficient for the team’s performance two years ago, or while the

recruits are juniors in high school, and so forth.
All teams in the FBS are observed for the data set. The cross section of teams is studied
over time, using data from 1998 to the present. The frequency of data is yearly- for each
season. With 120 teams under observation for 14 years, 1649 total observations will be
included in this data set with the final year of data being incomplete6. Explanatory variables of
Equation I are observed for 2011, but not the dependent variable. Recruiting rankings are
observable from 2002 on, while team ratings are available since 1998. With four lags needed in
Equation I, there is enough data to begin the data series in 2006, lasting six years, ending with
2011 inclusive. For Equation II, there is enough data to begin the data series in 2002. This panel
6

8 schools unbalance the panel since their teams are newer than 1998. Buffalo and Middle Tennessee
began in 1999, UConn in 2000, South Florida and Troy in 2001, FAU and Florida International in 2004, and
Western Kentucky in 2007. They are not thrown out of the data in order to keep the results unbiased
(Most these teams are from the bottom half of the team ratings).
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study gleans data from various sources: Scout.com, Sports-reference.com, ESPN.go.com and
USA Today7.
To summarize, the empirical model (Model I) of simultaneous equations is given as:
Equation I: TP = f (RC,

,

Equation II: RC = g (

,

,
,

,
,

)
)

All the variables used are displayed in the table below:
List of Variables
Variable:
TP (Dependent)

RC, t-3

Team performance- Final Sagarin
rating of the year
Recruiting Class Ranking (#1 is
best) of current red-shirt players
RC’s 1st lag or current freshman
players
RC’s 2nd lag or current
sophomore players
RC’s 3rd lag or junior players

RC, t-4

RC’s final lag or senior players

TP, t-1 (Explanatory in Equation
II, as are the remaining variables)
TP, t-2

Team Performance’s 1st lag

TP, t-3

Team Performance’s 3rd lag

TP, t-4

Team Performance’s 4th lag

RC (Explanatory in Equation I,
Dependent in Equation II)
RC, t-1 (Explanatory in Equation
I, along with remaining RC lags)
RC, t-2

7

Represents:

Team Performance’s 2nd lag

http://www.usatoday.com/sports/sagarin-archive.htm
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Team Performance and Recruiting Class Rankings have the following descriptive
statistics:
Summary Statistics8
TP

RC

Mean

70.8236

Mean

59.1121

Standard Error

0.3144

Standard Error

0.9860

Median

71.23

Median

59

Mode

65.9

Mode

107

Standard Deviation

12.2956

Standard Deviation

33.7130

Sample Variance

151.1806

Sample Variance

1136.5670

Kurtosis

-0.30

Kurtosis

-1.1766

Skewness

-0.0930

Skewness

0.0038

Range

76.46

Range

119

Minimum

30.47

Minimum

1

Maximum

106.93

Maximum

120

Count

1529

Count

1190

8

All output values throughout the paper are rounded to the nearest ten-thousandth
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ESTIMATION
Estimation of the empirical model is performed with the instrumental variable
technique using the Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
regression methods. This is accomplished using R software and its “Systemfit” package, which
includes functions for simultaneous equations and testing data. The 3SLS and 2SLS estimators
are chosen as opposed to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) because the OLS estimator is biased in
simultaneous equations (Hamann and Henningsen, 2007). The disturbance term of one
equation and a regressor are correlated9, violating Assumption Three (exogeneity of the
independent variables) of the Classical Linear Regressions Model (Greene, 2008). Weighted
Least Squares (WLS) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) are not estimators of choice
either since they rely on the assumption of exogeneity.
Given that variable RC is an endogenous explanatory variable in Equation I, the
instrumental variable technique is used for estimation. A proper choice for an instrumental
variable is one that is not correlated to the disturbance term, but is correlated with the
endogenous regressor (Greene, 2008). To instrument for endogenous variables in simultaneous
equations, exogenous variables are used (Hamann and Henningsen, 2007). For this model, RC
and its four lags along with TP’s four lags are all proper instrument choices. Langelett used only
3SLS estimation, but 3SLS here tests negative for consistency using the Hausman Specification
Test, shown in the next table (Langelett, 2003). Under the null hypothesis of this test, all
exogenous variables are uncorrelated with all disturbance terms (Hamann and Henningsen,
2007). Therefore, 3SLS is inconsistent and 2SLS is the preferred estimator for this study.

9

Precisely, the Equation II disturbance term is correlated with Equation II’s RC since RC is an endogenous
variable. When the disturbance is high, RC is high too, which simultaneously raises RC in equation I.
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Hausman Specification Test
Data

Model I

Hausman Test Statistic

171.1664

Degrees of Freedom

11

P-value

<2.2e-16

Model I’s output10 is summarized below:
Model I Output (2SLS)11
Coefficient
Standard Error
Estimates

Equation I
Adj. R-squared:
.4846
Intercept

85.7842

0.7190

119.3181

***

RC

-0.0833

0.0239

-3.4846

***

RC_1

-0.0475

0.0247

-1.9258

.

RC_2

-0.0787

0.0257

-3.0596

**

RC_3

-0.0515

0.0253

-2.0375

*

RC_4

0.0118

0.0239

0.4931

Significance Code

*** .001

** .01

*.05

Coefficient
Estimates

Standard Error

T-Value

. .10

Equation II
Adj. R-squared:
.5984
Intercept

240.9283

6.1835

38.9632

***

TP_1

-0.8621

0.1231

-7.0013

***

TP_2

-0.4894

0.1329

-3.6830

***

TP_3

-0.5306

0.1318

-4.0247

***

TP_4

-0.6778

0.1193

-5.6798

***

Significance Code

*** .001

** .01

*.05

. .10

10

T-Value

Significance

Significance

The estimation of systems of equations with unequal numbers of observations has not been thoroughly
tested yet, therefore lowering the n observations to 591 (Hamann and Henningsen, 2007)
11

See Appendix A for output results using the 3SLS estimator
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All variables are statistically significant and their coefficient estimates have the expected
negative sign, with the exception of RC_4. This exception is an inaccurate result that is fixed in
Model II. For Equation I and II, recruiting class rankings are set up so that lower is better. The
top recruiting class each year is awarded the #1 ranking. The worst recruiting class is ranked
#12012. Higher ratings for teams indicate better performance. Therefore, for better recruiting
classes to lead to higher team performance, the negative sign is expected. For recent on-field
success to attract more talented recruits, the negative coefficient sign is also correct.
The model tests negative for heteroscedasticity using the Studentized Breusch-Pagan
Test. I fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity as seen in the following table:
Studentized Breusch-Pagan Test
Data

Equation I

Equation II

BP test statistic

2.32

2.3081

Degrees of Freedom

5

4

P-value

.8031

.6793

However, the model tests positive for multicollinearity. The following tables show the
correlation between variables which indicates the problem of collinearity:

12

120 teams have existed since 2007, 119 from 2004-2006, 117 from 2001-2003, 115 in 2000, 114 in
1999, and 112 in 1998
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Equation I
Correlation13
TP

TP

RC

RC_1

RC_2

RC_3

RC_4

1

-.67

-.66

-.67

-.66

-.62

RC

-.67

1

.87

.87

.86

.85

RC_1

-.66

.87

1

.87

.86

.85

RC_2

-.67

.87

.87

1

.88

.86

RC_3

-.66

.86

.86

.88

1

.87

RC_4

-.62

.85

.85

.86

.87

1

Equation II
Correlation
RC

RC

TP_1

TP_2

TP_3

TP_4

1

-.68

-.68

-.67

-.66

TP_1

-.68

1

.75

.66

.61

TP_2

-.68

.75

1

.74

.66

TP_3

-.67

.66

.74

1

.73

TP_4

-.66

.61

.66

.73

1

An absolute value of 0.8 or greater correlation between two variables is considered high
collinearity, while .5 - .8 is the range used for moderate collinearity (Kennedy, 2008). The high
multicollinearity in Equation I explains the strange exception found in this equation. To correct
for multicollinearity, OLS regressions are run on each explanatory variable, following literary
practice (Langelett, 2003). These results are shown at continuation and summarized as “Model
II”:

13

Figures in correlation tables rounded to nearest one-hundredth
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.4423

84.6850

-0.2305

.0080

-28.85

***

RC_1

.4270

84.4033

-0.2259

.0085

-26.43

***

RC_2

.4276

84.3528

-0.2244

.0090

-24.80

***

RC_3

.4354

84.5547

-0.2264

.0010

-23.37

***

RC_4

.3887

83.7198

-0.2133

.0110

-19.40

***

Equation II:
Dependent
Variable – RC
TP_1

Adj. Rsquared

Constant

Coefficient
Estimates

Standard
Error

T-Value

Significance

.4688

197.0505 -1.9434

0.0605

-32.12

***

TP_2

.4636

193.9419 -1.9021

0.0598

-31.79

***

TP_3

.4433

189.1465 -1.8346

0.0601

-30.51

***

TP_4

.4394

185.2543 -1.7810

0.0588

-30.27

***

Significance

Adj. Rsquared

Model II Output (Separate Regressions)
Constant14 Coefficient Standard T-Value
Estimates
Error

Equation I:
Dependent
Variable – TP
RC

*** .001 ** .01

*.05

Significance

. .10

RC_4 in the Team Performance Equation now has the expected negative sign for its
coefficient estimate and all explanatory variables in both equations are highly significant. The
most recent class to sign has the strongest impact on team performance. This will include
freshmen, but mostly red-shirt players. This contradicts the hypothesis suggesting that the first
lag, or mostly freshman players, has the strongest effect. The recruiting class with the second
highest impact (by evaluating coefficient estimates) on team performance is the third lag, or
mostly junior players. This result is intuitive because recruits should grow and improve in their
coach’s system, and by their final years be playing more than the other players. With junior
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See Appendix B for the constants’ standard error, T-Value and significance level values
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players (and senior players who have not red-shirted) producing more minutes played, their
talent should have a greater impact on their team’s performance than the previous two lags.
Team Performance is found to significantly explain recruiting. Contrary to the
hypothesis, TP_1, or a team’s performance while a recruit is a senior in high school, has the
strongest impact on recruiting. This result is instinctive, since high school recruits make final
decisions on where to play during their senior year. High school recruits appear to base their
decision off of the most recent on-field results.
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CONCLUSIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS
These models show a “feedback” system in the college football market. More work
could be done to study the Team Performance Equation. Theory states that the freshmen
(recruiting class talent lagged one year) most impact a team’s performance, while this study
found the first year recruiting class to most impact the team’s success. Perhaps less athletes are
red-shirting than when George Langelett studied this issue. Maybe the composition of recruits
is changing with the junior college & transfer/high school recruit ratio rising. I believe talent’s
role in the college football market, including coaching talent, needs to be better understood.
Because recruiting classes experience their strongest effect on team performance right after
signing, further study needs to determine if coaching talent is explaining team performance
after the first year. Other factors besides coaching talent may explain the diminished recruiting
effect on team performance. Perhaps the model should be expanded to include other variables.
Schools in the FBS expend significant amounts of resources on recruiting. Equation I
proves that recruiting impacts team performance. Schools are validated in their actions by this
evidence. Recruits significantly impact their team years after signing, with their impact being
largest the first year. Team performance in turn affects recruiting. Prospective FBS football
players appear to base their decision of where to play mainly on the most recent college football
results, while they are seniors in high school. The bidirectional causation theory of recruiting
talent and team performance extends from its application of top teams to the entire FBS and
explains the lack of team performance mobility from year to year.
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Appendix A – Model I Output (3SLS)
Equation I
Adj. R-squared:
.4606
Intercept

Coefficient
Estimates
87.9945

.7085

124.2045

***

RC

-0.1816

.0227

-8.0137

***

RC_1

-0.0295

.0234

-1.2617

RC_2

-0.0624

.0244

-2.5600

RC_3

-0.0340

.0240

-1.4161

RC_4

0.0207

.0226

.9153

Significance Code

*** .001

** .01

*.05

Coefficient
Estimates

Standard Error

T-Value

Standard Error

Significance

*

. .10

Equation II
Adj. R-squared:
.5952
Intercept

T-Value

Significance

247.6817

6.0701

40.8034

***

TP_1

-1.1067

.1169

-9.4668

***

TP_2

-.4454

.1260

-3.5333

***

TP_3

-.5090

.1251

-4.0698

***

TP_4

-0.5934

.1133

-5.2368

***

Significance Code

*** .001

** .01

*.05

. .10
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Appendix B – Model II’s Output of Intercepts

Equation I:
Dependent
Variable – TP
RC

.4423

84.6850

.5423

156.17

***

RC_1

.4270

84.4033

.5810

145.28

***

RC_2

.4276

84.3528

.6160

136.9

***

RC_3

.4354

84.5547

.6620

127.72

***

RC_4

.3887

83.7198

.7535

111.10

***

Equation II:
Dependent
Variable – RC
TP_1

Adj. Rsquared

Adj. Rsquared

Constant

SE

T-Value

T-Value

Significance

Constant

SE

Significance

.4688

197.0505

4.3544

45.25

***

TP_2

.4636

193.9419

4.3023

45.08

***

TP_3

.4433

189.1465

4.3247

43.74

***

TP_4

.4394

185.2543

4.2318

43.78

***
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Appendix C – R Code
## Counting profits, recruiting expenses...
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop")
dat <- read.csv("thesis.csv", header=T)
head(dat)
n<-nrow(dat)
dat$profit <- rep("", n)
head(dat)
for (i in 1:n) {
if (dat$Revenues[i] > dat$Expenses[i])
dat$profit[i]<-1
else dat$profit[i]<-0
}
head(dat)
table(dat$profit)
dat$prof.amount<-dat$Revenues - dat$Expenses
head(dat)
dat
dat$profit.10m <- rep("",n)
head(dat)
for (i in 1:n) {
if (dat$prof.amount[i] > 9999999)
dat$profit.10m[i]<-1
else dat$profit.10m[i]<-0
}
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head(dat,20)
table(dat$profit.10m)
max(dat$prof.amount)
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\footballprofit.csv"
write.table(dat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE)

## For recruiting expenses
dat <- read.csv("ADprofit.csv", header=T)
head(dat)
n<-nrow(dat)
dat$RE.1m <- rep("", n)
head(dat)
for (i in 1:n) {
if (dat$Total[i] > 999999)
dat$RE.1m[i]<-1
else dat$RE.1m[i]<-0
}
head(dat)
table(dat$RE.1m)
## Save together
dat$prof.amount<-dat$Revenues - dat$Expenses
head(dat)
dat$profit.10m <- rep("",n)
head(dat)
for (i in 1:n) {
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if (dat$prof.amount[i] > 9999999)
dat$profit.10m[i]<-1
else dat$profit.10m[i]<-0
}
head(dat,20)
table(dat$profit.10m)
max(dat$prof.amount)
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\ADprofit.csv"
write.table(dat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE)
## Repeated for csv with 2003 figures

## Code for getting variable absolute difference:
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop")
dat<-read.csv("Sagarin.csv", header=T)
head(dat)
dat<-dat[1:9]
head(dat)
dat$Difference <- abs(dat$Difference)
head(dat)
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\Sagarin.csv"
write.table(dat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE)

## Code for obtaining range variable:

rang<-list()
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for (i in 1:120) {
rang[[i]] <- range(tmpdat[[i]]$Rating)
}
rang

## Equation I code of Simultaneous System
# Creating lags for RC ranking
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop")
dat <- read.csv("sagarin.csv", header=T)
head(dat)
dat<-dat[1:11]
head(dat)
teams <- as.character(unique(dat$Team))
teams
length(teams)
tmp <- list()
dat$Team <- as.character(dat$Team)
dat$Conf.11<- as.character(dat$Conf.11)
tmpdat <- list()
for(i in 1:120) { tmpdat[[i]] <- dat[dat$Team == teams[i], ]; }
tmpdat[[1]]
newdat <- list()
tmp <- tmpdat[[1]]
lags <- 4
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for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$Rating[(lags+1):n],
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$RC, lags+1)); }
newdat
newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat)
newdat <- list()
for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$Rating[(lags+1):n],
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n], embed(tmp$RC, lags+1)); }
names(newdat) <- teams
for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(newdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(rep(names(newdat[[i]]), n), newdat[[i]]) }
newdat
data.class(names(newdat))
tmp
n <- nrow(tmp)
new <- cbind(tmp$Rating[(lags+1):n], tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$RC,
lags+1))
nm <- unique(as.character(tmp$Team))
n <- nrow(new)
nate <- data.frame(cbind(rep(nm, n), new))
newdat <- list()
names(tmpdat) <- teams
tmpdat

for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(tmpdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- data.frame(Team=rep(teams[i], n-lags),
Rating=tmpdat[[i]]$Rating[(lags+1):n], Year=tmpdat[[i]]$Year[(lags+1):n],
Conf.11=tmpdat[[i]]$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmpdat[[i]]$RC, lags+1)); }
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newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat)
newdat
names(newdat) <- c("Team", "Rating", "Year", "Conf.11", "RC", "RC_1", "RC_2", "RC_3", "RC_4")
head(newdat,25)
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\Model4.csv"
write.table(newdat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE)

##### Equation II of Simultaneous Eq system
# Creating lags for Team Performance (Rating)
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop")
dat <- read.csv("sagarin.csv", header=T)
dat<-dat[1:11]
head(dat)
teams <- as.character(unique(dat$Team))
teams
length(teams)
tmp <- list()
dat$Team <- as.character(dat$Team)
dat$Conf.11<- as.character(dat$Conf.11)
tmpdat <- list()
for(i in 1:120) { tmpdat[[i]] <- dat[dat$Team == teams[i], ]; }
tmpdat[[1]]
newdat <- list()
tmp <- tmpdat[[1]]
lags <- 4
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for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$RC[(lags+1):n],
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$Rating, lags+1)); }
newdat
newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat)
newdat <- list()
for(i in 1:120) { tmp <- tmpdat[[i]]; n <- nrow(tmp); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(tmp$RC[(lags+1):n],
tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n], embed(tmp$Rating, lags+1)); }
names(newdat) <- teams
for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(newdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- cbind(rep(names(newdat[[i]]), n), newdat[[i]]) }
newdat
data.class(names(newdat))
tmp
n <- nrow(tmp)
new <- cbind(tmp$RC[(lags+1):n], tmp$Year[(lags+1):n], tmp$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmp$Rating,
lags+1))
nm <- unique(as.character(tmp$Team))
n <- nrow(new)
nate <- data.frame(cbind(rep(nm, n), new))
newdat <- list()
names(tmpdat) <- teams
tmpdat

for(i in 1:120) { n <- nrow(tmpdat[[i]]); newdat[[i]] <- data.frame(Team=rep(teams[i], n-lags),
RC=tmpdat[[i]]$RC[(lags+1):n], Year=tmpdat[[i]]$Year[(lags+1):n],
Conf.11=tmpdat[[i]]$Conf.11[(lags+1):n],embed(tmpdat[[i]]$Rating, lags+1)); }
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newdat <- do.call("rbind", newdat)
newdat
names(newdat) <- c("Team", "RC", "Year", "Conf.11", "Rating", "Rating_1", "Rating_2", "Rating_3",
"Rating_4")
head(newdat,25)
outfile <- "C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop\\Model5.csv"
write.table(newdat, file=outfile, quote=FALSE, sep=",", row.names=FALSE, col.names=TRUE)

## Model II contains everything to now run Simultaneous EQ Code: 3SLS
setwd("C:\\Users\\Nate\\Desktop")
dat <- read.csv("Model2.csv", header=TRUE)
library(systemfit)
data.frame(dat)
dat1 <- na.omit(dat)
library(plm)
dat2 <- pdata.frame(dat1, index=c("Team"), drop.index=TRUE, row.names=TRUE)
head(dat2)

I <- Rating ~ RC + RC_1 + RC_2 + RC_3 + RC_4
II <- RC ~ Rating_1 + Rating_2 + Rating_3 + Rating_4
inst <- ~RC + RC_1 + RC_2 + RC_3 + RC_4 + Rating_1 + Rating_2 + Rating_3 + Rating_4
system <- list(I=I, II=II)
fit3sls <- systemfit(system, method = "3SLS", inst = inst, data = dat2)
summary(fit3sls)
fit2sls <- systemfit(system, method = "2SLS", inst = inst, data=dat2)
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summary(fit2sls)
## NB: Pooled by default = false. Same results as if pooled=TRUE in system fit function

## Hausman Specification test:
h<-hausman.systemfit(fit2sls, fit3sls)
print(h)
## Reject the Null hypothesis - 3SLS is inconsistent

## Test for Heteroskedasticity
bptest(I, data=dat)
bptest(II, data=dat)
## Homoskedasticity assumption holds

## Test for multicollinearity: EQ I
T<-(cbind(dat$Rating, dat$RC, dat$RC_1, dat$RC_2, dat$RC_3, dat$RC_4))
T<-as.matrix(T)
T<-na.omit(T)
cor(T)
## Very Large collinearity (>.8)
## Multicollinearity: EQ II
T<-(cbind(dat$RC, dat$Rating_1, dat$Rating_2, dat$Rating_3, dat$Rating_4))
T<-as.matrix(T)
T<-na.omit(T)
cor(T)
## Moderate Collinearity (<.8)
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## Model III: separate regression for each variable:
dat <- read.csv("Model2.csv", header=TRUE)
mod1.RC <- lm(Rating ~ RC, data=dat)
summary(mod1.RC)
mod1.RC_1 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_1, data=dat)
summary(mod1.RC_1)
mod1.RC_2 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_2, data=dat)
summary(mod1.RC_2)
mod1.RC_3 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_3, data=dat)
summary(mod1.RC_3)
mod1.RC_4 <- lm(Rating ~ RC_4, data=dat)
summary(mod1.RC_4)

## Equation II:
Rating1 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_1, data=dat)
summary(Rating1)
Rating2 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_2, data=dat)
summary(Rating2)
Rating3 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_3, data=dat)
summary(Rating3)
Rating4 <- lm(RC ~ Rating_4, data=dat)
summary(Rating4)

